This is a follow up of sorts to my post on "Operation Sapphire", which was the US operation to remove a large amount of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan.

The Washington Post today has an online pictorial and story by Philip Pan that describe the results of Soviet nuclear weapons testing in Kazakhstan and the current struggle to control access to uranium in the country. Pan does a good job looking in depth at the issues of uranium access that cross borders from Russia, to Japan, North America and Europe. One note on the online pictorial, some of the images of the people affected by the radiation from the testing can be rather graphic and stark, so consider yourself warned before you click on the link.

What should be of concern in who ends up with control of Kazakh uranium are the regional concerns as Iran looks to develop its nuclear program. While it looks like there is no direct outright connection between Kazakh uranium and Iran's nuclear program has been acknowledeged officially that I know of, the geography of the area makes the possibility of a connection a little more real.

David Hoffman, a Washington Post contributing editor, has released a new book, Dead Hand, that explores the history of the US/USSR arms race during the 80s and 90s. In it, he devotes a few pages to Operation Sapphire in which he does report a connection between Kazakhstan and Tehran. His reporting only makes the concern of a connection between Central Asia and Iran's nuclear program a little more real. If you don't have time to get the book, take a listen to Terrry Gross' interview with Hoffman on her NPR Show Fresh Air.

Thanks to the Perry Castaneda online map collection at University of Texas for the map of Central Asia. Sphere: Related Content

Project Sapphire, the good old days

The early nineties were great. Your biggest concern was not bumping into an unmarked, left over minefield in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Russia and the US held joint manuevers, it was good times for all.

Meanwhile, in Kazakhstan, the US paid the Kazakh government 27 million dollars to take several hundred tons of highly enriched uranium off of its hands. David Hoffman, in the Washington Post, tells the story of a US counter proliferation project called Project Sapphire. While it's not George Clooney chasing a rogue nuclear bomber around the world, it does show how good policy can effectively keep nuclear genies in the bottle. Nuclear material has value to countries as either a source of energy, or a source of power to cow their neighbors or bring parity with another nuclear power in the region.

Our best policy in this region would be to keep encouraging Russian and Central Asian counter proliferation efforts both within their borders and in the region. The latest revelation about Iran's nuclear weapons efforts only make their cooperation more important. Sphere: Related Content

Pulling the plug on missle defense in Eastern Europe

At the end of the week, President Obama announced that he is changing America's concept for missle defense in regards to countering Iran's future nuclear ballistic missile capabilities. Previously, the US had planned to counter Iranian missiles through a series of radars and interceptors stationed in Europe. This obviously has been an irritant to Moscow since it was announced. Since the end of the cold war, and even prior to it, Moscow has considered it's strategic nuclear capability as an answer to what it percieved as NATOs and the US military edge. It believes that what keeps Russia safe at night is it's strategic nuclear forces.

If we were still looking to fight a nuclear WWIII, that line of thought would hold some water, but Russia, through its recent military history, and it's observation of recent US military history, I think has seen that it can no longer think that way. Statements by Medvedev over this past year have shown that the political leadership want to break that old way of thinking. Russia now wants a military that is professional, flexible and agile. He needs a force that can quickly move to trouble spots and get control before the violence spreads. Medvedev knows that the threats that Russia faces will be along and inside its border and nuclear weapons will do nothing to solve them.

Consider this also. Russia has a strong concern about the part of the Near Abroad that encompasses the caucuses and the central asia. This part of the near abroad have invasion routes in the past into Russia and also now host a growing muslim population that chafes under Moscow's rule and influence. With our withdrawal from a robust and very public missile defense program in eastern europe to a more low key program, it may put the onus on Russia to become more involved in counter proliferation in the area. Why? For one thing, having a nuclear armed Iran in the vicinity of it's near abroad runs counter to its own national security. Secondly, Russia has been a major provider of military equipment to Iran. By this virtue of arms sales that Iran really needs, Russia has a greater stick and carrot effect than we could hope for. Thirdly, Russia and Iran have much in common, government wise. Both countries are "managed democracies". They both hold open and democratic elections (for the most part), but the powers that be, whether it be the Siloviki/United Russia Party or the Revolutionary Council and Supreme Leader maintain a very strong sway over the government and its actions. As we see in international relations, similar countries tend to associate, cooperate, build concensus and create coaltions with like countries. That is why it is possible that Russia would also have more of an influence over Iran than we could hope to have in the near future.

So in the end, I believe that this is a shrewd move by the Obama administration which opens doors for Russia to contribute more positively to the global community in terms of counter proliferation. But what does Putin think... Sphere: Related Content